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Abstract
Wal-Mart v. Dukes overturned the certification of a class of a million and a half female
employees alleging sex discrimination in Wal-Mart’s salary and promotion decisions. The
Supreme Court ruled that the case did not satisfy the requirement that a class have a common
question of law or fact, and said that the remedy sought was not the type of relief available under
the portion of the class action rule permitting mandatory class actions. Over the last two years,
courts have struggled with how to apply the ruling, especially how to apply it beyond its
immediate context of employment discrimination litigation.
In two prominent cases under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the
federal courts of appeals have displayed remarkably different attitudes about class actions after
Wal-Mart. This article will discuss these two leading cases, describe additional post-Wal-Mart
class action decisions in IDEA and analogous contexts, then consider how Wal-Mart will affect
the litigation decisions of advocates trying to address systemic violations of IDEA, and the
courts’ likely reactions.
Analysis of Wal-Mart and the cases decided in its wake suggests that group litigation to
enforce IDEA will continue to be viable, but also that the litigation will change. Plaintiffs
bringing IDEA class actions will likely attempt to distinguish Wal-Mart as a case preoccupied
with interpreting underlying employment discrimination law. They will frame their cases as
challenges to specifically defined policies and practices, and they will probably propose smaller,
more tightly circumscribed classes or subclasses. They will also be likely to pursue non-class
action approaches to addressing systemic violations of the law, bringing individual actions for
broad relief, asking for group administrative remedies, and seeking action by governmental
entities with the power to sue to enforce the IDEA rights.
Much has been written about the Wal-Mart and its impact on class action procedure and
the enforcement of substantive law. This Article seeks to contribute to the discussion by
analyzing the case’s application to a field in which class action litigation has been a prominent
means of enforcing important statutory rights, and by determining how litigants and courts are
likely to respond.
__________________
* Vincent DePaul Professor of Law, DePaul University. Thanks to Nicole Porter, Stephanie Green, and the other
organizers of the Law Review’s Education Law Symposium. Many thanks to Derek Black, Terry Jean Seligmann,
and Robert Garda for their comments on the manuscript. Special thanks to my research assistant, Lee Robbins. ©
2013 Mark C. Weber.

IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes
Wal-Mart v. Dukes 1 overturned the certification of a class of a million and a half female
employees claiming sex discrimination in Wal-Mart’s salary and promotion decisions. The
Supreme Court ruled that the case did not satisfy the requirement that a class have a common
question of law or fact, 2 and said that the remedy sought was not the type of relief available
under the portion of the class action rule providing for mandatory class actions. 3 After the Court
decided Wal-Mart in 2011, courts have struggled with how to apply the ruling, especially how to
apply it beyond its immediate context of allegations of employment discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 4
Nowhere are the questions more pressing than in cases under the federal law
guaranteeing the right to appropriate education for children with disabilities. In two prominent
cases under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 5 the federal courts of
appeals have displayed remarkably different attitudes about class actions after Wal-Mart. 6 This
article will discuss these two leading cases, describe a range of additional post-Wal-Mart class
action decisions in IDEA and analogous contexts, then consider how Wal-Mart will affect the
litigation decisions of advocates trying to address systemic violations of IDEA, and the courts’
likely reactions.
Analysis of Wal-Mart and the cases decided in its wake suggests that group litigation to
enforce IDEA will continue to be viable, but also that the litigation will change. Plaintiffs

1

131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Id. at 2553.
3
Id. at 2557 (referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (2)).
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2006).
5
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
6
DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th
Cir. 2012).
2

2

bringing IDEA class actions will likely attempt to distinguish Wal-Mart as a case preoccupied
with interpreting underlying employment discrimination law. They will frame their cases in
terms of challenges to carefully defined policies and practices, and they will probably advance
smaller, more tightly circumscribed classes or subclasses. They may also to pursue non-class
action approaches to addressing systemic violations of the special education law by bringing
individual actions for broad relief, asking for group administrative remedies, and seeking action
by governmental entities with the power to sue to enforce the IDEA rights in the courts.
IDEA is a critical component of education law in the United States, 7 and no small source
of business for the federal and state courts. 8 Originally passed as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 9 IDEA requires that states that receive federal special
education money (now all fifty states as well as six outlying areas) ensure that all children with
disabilities are offered free, appropriate public education, with necessary related services, in
settings that are, to the maximum extent appropriate, inclusive with children who do not have
disabilities. 10 IDEA’s “child-find” provision demands that all children with disabilities be
identified, located, and evaluated, and that a practical method be developed and implemented to
determine which children with disabilities currently receive the special education and related

7

As a small indication of this fact, Education Law casebooks uniformly devote at least one chapter to IDEA and the
education of children with disabilities. See, e.g., SCOTT F. JOHNSON & SARAH E. REDFIELD, EDUCATION LAW: A
PROBLEM-BASED APPROACH ch. 12 (2d ed. 2012); CHARLES J. RUSSO, REUTTER’S THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
ch. 15 (8th ed. 2012).
8
A modest indication of this reality is that the Supreme Court has decided fourteen cases involving the statute since
its passage. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.
516 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291(2006); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 501 U.S. 1 (1993); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66
(1999); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993);
Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985), Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883
(1984); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Several of these cases have been legislatively overruled in
whole or part as the statute has been amended over the years.
9
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
10
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9) (free, appropriate public education and related services), (26) (related services); 1412(a)(1)
(free, appropriate public education), (a)(5) (inclusion with children without disabilities) (2006).
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services they need and which do not. 11 The statute affords procedural rights 12 and sets out
protections from student discipline measures that might interfere with delivery of educational
services. 13 Significantly, parents have the right to go to court to challenge failures to provide
educational rights and services guaranteed by the law. 14 Frequently, they have exercised these
rights by bringing class action cases in federal court asserting that school districts or state
educational agencies have systemically failed to comply with the law. These systemic failings
include imposing arbitrary limits on the availability of services rather than treating children
individually, charging parents for services that are supposed to be free, not identifying, locating,
and evaluating all children with disabilities within the jurisdiction of a school district, or
engaging in other large-scale violations of the statute’s terms. 15
Though Wal-Mart is barely two years old, the scholarship on it fills volumes. 16 Many
scholars have questioned its interpretation of the federal class action rule 17 or contended that its

11

Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (“Child find”).
Id. § 1415 (procedural rights).
13
Id. § 1415(k) (disciplinary protections).
14
Id. § 1415(i).
15
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes ___ and accompanying text (describing class action litigation under IDEA).
16
One such volume of interest is the aptly titled Symposium, Class Action Rollback: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the
Future of Class Action Litigation, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 653 (2013).
17
E.g., Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight over Commonality in the Era of Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 711, 721 (2013) (“The blurring of the commonality and predominance standards is
problematic because it makes prediction difficult. Have the two standards disappeared, replaced by one
“predominance of common questions” standard?”); Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 751, 758 (2012) (“[P]roof of classwide injury should not be required to certify a class. Instead, a class action
should be certified if, along with the other prerequisites of Rule 23, the class shares common questions of liability,
not common answers of injury. Accordingly, the trend of requiring proof of classwide injury, most strikingly seen in
the Wal-Mart decision and its interpretation of the commonality requirement, should reverse course.”); Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729, 776 (2013) (“The majority decision in Dukes
cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of Rule 23(a)(2). Nothing in the text of Rule 23(a)(2), or in the
Advisory Committee Notes thereto, requires that the common question be central to the outcome.”); Suzette M.
Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 34, 4445 (2011) (“[T]o satisfy commonality generally, judges may now require a stronger causal connection between an
employer's discretionary decisionmaking policy and a disparity or adverse employment action. This shift will make
it harder for employees relying on this theory to act collectively. . . . The Court's unanimous conclusion that back
pay was not appropriate for the type of class action certified in Dukes was surprising. This gratuitous decision
effectively reversed almost a half-century of Title VII jurisprudence permitting back pay under such
circumstances.”) (footnote omitted); Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the
Future of Class Actions and Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 711, 718 (2013) (“The Court’s
12
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approach works at cross-purposes to underlying Title VII objectives. 18 Others have defended the
ruling, saying that if it is read properly, it will make systemic litigation more manageable. 19 This

analysis in Dukes is highly puzzling as a doctrinal matter, with regard to both the law governing class actions and
the law of employment discrimination.”); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 153 (2011) (“These Wal-Mart
rulings crafted new impediments to the congressional charter authorizing private enforcement of Title VII as well as
to Rule 23's recognition of different kinds of relatedness (the (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classes) as a predicate for
aggregation under judicial supervision.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 444 (2013) (“Nothing in the language or history of Rule 23(a)(2)
supports the Dukes majority's interpretation of it.”); see Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, Trial,
Nov. 2011, at 54 (“It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the Court's approach in Wal-Mart with an abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review. The district court made extensive findings as to why there was sufficient commonality
to permit a class action suit, but at no point did Scalia's majority opinion suggest the slightest deference to the trial
court. . . . The Wal-Mart decision reflects a conservative majority that is quite hostile to class action suits.”).
18
E.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal Pay, 46
NEW ENG. L. REV. 229, 234-35 (2012) (“Although Title VII disparate- impact theory permits plaintiffs to allege that
an otherwise neutral employment policy has discriminatory results, the Court’s holding in Wal-Mart may eviscerate
the viability of this theory for many women, particularly national classes.”) (footnote omitted); Armin J. Jezari, In
Lieu of Wal-Mart v. Dukes: A Need to Promulgate a More Reasonable Significant Proof Standard for Title VII
Class Certification, 26 S.U. L. REV. 119, 141 (2012) (“These new models of class certification for Title VII suits
seem to undermine theories of disparate impact.”); Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment
Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 413 (2011) (stating that Court’s approach of requiring discriminatory
policy “pushes a reshaping of the use of statistics in systemic disparate treatment cases.”); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights
and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 464-66, 468-74 (2011) (criticizing Court’s rejection of
statistical modeling for remedial interpretations as destructive of Title VII principles); Suzette M. Malveaux, Power
and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action Landscape after Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
659, 661 (2013); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, The Hazards of Dukes: The Substantive Consequences of a
Procedural Decision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 132-33 (2012) (contending that Wal-Mart undermined precedent
permitting disparate impact liability based on delegation of subjective decision making and opened door to
unconscious bias); Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 447 (2012) (concluding that Wal-Mart effectively altered law of systemic employment
discrimination).
19
E.g., Saby Ghoshray, Hijacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Probing Commonality and Due
Process Concerns in Modern Class Action Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 467, 471 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court's
holding in Dukes is merely a course correction to counter the unbridled use of statistics in class action litigation.”)
(footnote omitted); Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21 (2011)
(“The Court was again correct in rejecting certification of the Wal-Mart class.”); Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging
Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 173-74 (2012) (contending that plaintiffs faced with
Wal-Mart’s interpretation of common question of law and fact will be forced to develop more sophisticated and
persuasive theories of discrimination); J. Britton Whitbeck, Identity Crisis: Class Certification, Aggregate Proof,
and How Rule 23 May Be Self-Defeating the Policy for Which It Was Established, 32 PACE L. REV. 488, 512 (2012)
(“[T]he Court's scrutiny of statistical and anecdotal evidence provides greater assurance that broad conclusions and
generalities will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Dukes was able to
reduce the inconsistent and varying standards for which the Rule was promulgated to prevent.”) (internal quotation
omitted); cf. Kathryn Smith, What Do 1.5 Million Wal-Mart Women Have in Common?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Class
Action Certification, 52 B.C. L. REV. E SUPP. 149, 157 (2011), http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/12/12_smith.pdf
(criticizing lower court decision that Wal-Mart overturned as creating unmanageable class and undermining Rule
23’s efficiency and fairness objectives). Some writers consider the case altogether less significant than it may
appear. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases
Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 434-36 (2012) (concluding from
empirical study that effect of Wal-Mart on Title VII cases challenging subjective employment practices will be
limited); Andrew J. Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy and Legal Change, 62 DEPAUL L.
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Article seeks to contribute to the literature by analyzing the case’s application to special
education law, a field in which class action litigation has been a prominent mechanism in
enforcing important statutory rights, and by working out how IDEA litigants and courts are
likely to respond to the case.
Part I of this Article discusses the close relationship between IDEA and class action
litigation. Part II takes up the Wal-Mart case, describing its facts and holding. Part III considers
Wal-Mart in relation to IDEA, discussing the two leading decisions from the courts of appeals
applying Wal-Mart to IDEA class actions, then considering additional IDEA cases and other
potentially analogous post-Wal-Mart judicial decisions. Part IV maps out how IDEA litigants
might respond to the invocation of Wal-Mart, and what success those responses might have in
the courts. It develops ways in which the case might be distinguished in class litigation by raising
differences in statutory terms between Title VII and IDEA, as well as by framing classes around
specific system-wide policies and forming more compact classes. It also considers ways in which
those attacking systemic violations of IDEA might bypass class action procedure in favor of
other legal mechanisms.
I. IDEA and Class Actions
IDEA originated in class action litigation. In Board of Education v. Rowley, 20 the most
prominent case interpreting the law that is now IDEA, the Supreme Court explained that the
statute was Congress’s response to a series of class actions brought in the federal courts claiming
that children with disabilities had the constitutional right to obtain appropriate educational

REV. 791, 793, 796 (2013); see also Zimmer, supra note ___ at 456 (“[T]he Wal-Mart opinion is so confused and
oddly organized that it may be viewed as having no effect on the law.”). As this and the preceding notes indicate,
one effect of the decision has been to elicit an alarming number of puns from writers of law review articles.
20
458 U.S. 176 (1982).

6

services. 21 The Court gave its greatest attention to two class actions, PARC v. Pennsylvania 22and
Mills v. District of Columbia, 23 which Congress reviewed in detail when writing the law. 24 The
legislative history of the statute evinces not merely an awareness of these and many other class
action cases asserting the equal protection and due process rights of children with disabilities to
an appropriate education, 25 but also a recognition that advocates would bring class action cases
under the new law. Thus in discussing the Act’s administrative exhaustion requirement, the
principal author stated that in class actions brought under the federal statute, unnamed class
members would not be expected to exhaust their administrative remedies. 26

21

Id. at 179 n.2 (“Two cases, Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C.1972),
and Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa.1971) and 343 F. Supp.
279 (1972), were later identified as the most prominent of the cases contributing to Congress' enactment of the Act
and the statutes which preceded it.”).
22
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.1971) (order entering agreement and injunction), 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972) (approving
amended stipulation and consent decree).
23
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.1972) (finding liability and entering judgment).
24
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 193-200 (discussing impact of PARC and Mills on law that became IDEA). These cases
were hardly unique. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Thomson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974) (overturning decision to abstain
in class action suit for establishment and maintenance of needed special education facilities); McMillan v. Bd. of
Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d. Cir. 1970) (reversing dismissal of class action right to education suit); see also sources
cited infra note ___ [next note] (noting congressional awareness of class action litigation over educational rights of
children with disabilities in many states). See generally MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 72-76 (2010) (detailing impact of PARC, Mills, and other litigation on
legislation that became IDEA).
25
See, e.g., Financial Assistance for Improved Educational Services for Handicapped Children: Hearings before the
Select Subcommittee on Education of the H. Comm. On Education and Labor, 93rd Cong. 277 (1974) (Statement of
Dr. Harrie M. Selznick, Consultant on Education) (“That class action suits have been filed in more than thirty states
by parents of handicapped children who have been denied enrollment in the special education programs of the public
schools is also reflective of the situation as it actually exists.”); Financial Assistance for Improved Educational
Services for Handicapped Children: Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Education of the H. Comm. On
Education and Labor, 93rd Cong. 208 (1974) (Statement of Samuel Teitelman, New Haven, Conn.) (“Parents of
handicapped children are now going as far as they must to provide services for their children. You are well aware of
the many ‘right to education’ class action suits currently in process in courts all over the country.”); Education for
All Handicapped Children, 1973-74: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. 118 (1973) (statement of William T. Cahill, Governor of New Jersey) ( “The
evident diversity throughout the Nation [in educational services for children with disabilities] in a large measure is
due to the interrelationship between such factors as public attitudes, philosophical commitment, political and
legislative interests in activism, local and State fiscal status, long term and more expedient priorities of the State, and
the latest critical variable, class action court suits.”); 121 Cong. Rec. 19,486-92 (1975) (Statement of Sen. Harrison
Williams) (detailing class action litigation in Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin).
26
121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).
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Precisely as Congress anticipated, class action litigation continued after the law came into
full effect in 1978, with plaintiffs now seeking to enforce rights under the statute as well as
constitutional rights. 27 In 1980, in Battle v. Pennsylvania, 28 the Third Circuit approved a class
action decision enjoining a limit of 180 instructional days per year for students with disabilities,
a restriction that applied irrespective of the students’ individual needs. 29 Other class cases early
in the life of the statute included Roncker v. Walter, 30 a decision from 1983 vacating the district
court’s refusal to certify a class in a case challenging a policy of automatically sending students
with severe intellectual disabilities to county schools; Edward B. v. Brunelle, 31 a 1986
disposition in which the court certified a class of children placed in residential facilities pursuant
to juvenile court proceedings who claimed they were not offered appropriate special education
services; Andre H. v. Ambach, 32 granting certification in 1985 to a class of children at a juvenile
center alleging they had been deprived of appropriate education, and Tonya K. v. Chicago Board

27

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976) (setting Sept. 1, 1978 as date for making appropriate education available to all
eligible children).
28
629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
29
The court required modifications of some district court orders, but left the injunctive and declaratory relief against
the defendant in place pending the modification. Id. at 281. The court emphasized the broad discretion of the district
court to define a class. I d. at 271 n.1.
30
700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.1983).
31
662 F. Supp. 1025 (D.N.H.1986).
32
104 F.R.D. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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of Education, 33 granting class certification in 1982 in an action alleging failures to place children
in private special education schools in a timely manner. 34
Class action litigation over special education issues continued to be a prominent part of
the picture during the various rewritings of IDEA, including the Handicapped Children’s
Protection Act of 1986, 35 which clarified rights to attorneys’ fees and specified the applicability
of exhaustion defenses, 36 the comprehensive revisions of the law in 1997 37 and, most recently,
2004, 38 all the way up to the present. 39 None of these revisions of the law ever placed any
obstacles in the way of class action litigation. 40

33

551 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Other early cases approving classes under the statute that became IDEA
include: Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming class action status despite argument plaintiffs
failed to exhaust administrative remedies in case over delays in evaluation and placement of children with
disabilities); Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving class certification in case challenging
denial of free education to students with disabilities), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 753 F.2d
1397 (7th Cir. 1985); William S. v. Gill, 98 F.R.D. 463 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (certifying class challenging failure to
guarantee related services deemed noneducational by defendant). As the Parks case exemplifies, disputes over class
action status in these cases were less likely to turn on common question of law or fact and more likely to involve
questions whether the claim of the named plaintiff was typical of that of the class. See Parks, 557 F. Supp. at 128586; see also William S., 98 F.RD. at 469-70 (rejecting challenge to class certification based on typicality).
34
As early as 1979 the practice of using class actions to address systemic problems with implementation of laws
passed to benefit those with disabilities was well enough established for legendary disability advocate Stanley Herr
to remark that:
Many public interest law programs representing retarded persons eschew individual representation
in favor of class action work, but the handful of aggressive advocacy organizations for the
developmentally disabled correctly avoid distinguishing between law reform and individual
service work, and see in each case some potential for affecting the entire system.
Stanley S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 602 (1979).
Herr was counsel for plaintiffs in Mills, among other noteworthy cases.
35
Pub. L. No. 99-372, §§ 2-3, 100 Stat. 796, 797.
36
See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S.
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong.106 (1985) (statement of E. Richard Larson, American Civil
Liberties Union) (“If [section] 3 is not enacted, it will mean, for example, that an illegal or unconstitutional
educational policy could not be challenged through a class action, which is the most convenient and inexpensive
method for parents and educational agencies alike to resolve policy disputes affecting large numbers of handicapped
children.”);131 CONG. REC. 21,393 (1985) (statement of Sen. Simon) (“S. 415 is also clearly not intended to modify
traditional standards used by the courts for determining when a class action suit can be filed, and the circumstances
under which it is appropriate to grant a preliminary injunction.”).
37
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37.
38
Pub. L. No. 108-446, §§ 2-3, 118 Stat. 2647.
39
Notable recent cases include: C.G. v. Penn. Dep't of Educ., CIV.A 1:06-CV-1523, 2009 WL 3182599 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 29, 2009) (certifying class challenging apportionment of special education funding); D.S. ex rel. S.S. v. N.Y.C.
Dep't of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting class certification in action challenging absence of
secondary school services for minority children with disabilities); L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D.
Fla. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss and excusing exhaustion in class action alleging denial of appropriate services

9

II. Wal-Mart v. Dukes
Enter Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. 41 Wal-Mart reversed the certification of a class in
an employment discrimination case brought by female workers at Wal-Mart’s retail operations,
who alleged that the discretion exercised by local supervisors over pay and promotion
constituted unlawful sex discrimination. 42 The Court held that the class did not satisfy the class
action requirement of having a common question of law or fact. 43 It also ruled that the class
could not be certified under the portion of the class action rule providing for class actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief, given the nature of the relief the plaintiffs wanted. 44
The Supreme Court analyzed the case according to Federal Rule 23, which provides that
class actions must meet all of the requirements of subsection (a) as well as the requirements of
one of the (b) subsections. 45 Subsection (a) requires (1) that the class is so numerous that
individual joinder is not practicable; (2) that there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of those of the class;
and (4) that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the class’s interests.
Subsection (b) allows for three types of class actions. Subsection (b)(1) allows for a class when
individual adjudications would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class or adjudications of individuals in the class would practically dispose of
interests of others not party to the adjudications, for example, a limited-fund case in which class

for children with autism); J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., No. 00 CV 513S, 2006 WL 581187 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
8, 2006) (certifying class of children not properly determined to be eligible for services under IDEA); see also
MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 21.5 nn. 88-89 (3d ed. 2008 & supps.)
(collecting sample of IDEA cases approving and denying class action status).
40
See WEBER, supra note __ [treatise, previous note] §§ 1.3(2), .5-.6 (tracing amendments to original federal special
education law up to present).
41
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
42
Id. at 2547
43
Id. at 2553.
44
Id. at 2557.
45
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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members are competing against each other for a fixed asset. Subsection (b)(2) permits a class
when the opponent of the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, making injunctive or declaratory relief for the class as a whole appropriate. Subsection (3)
covers classes in which the questions of law or fact that are common to the class predominate
over any questions affecting individual members, and the class action is superior to other
methods for resolving the case fairly and efficiently.
At one and a half million members, the Wal-Mart class had no difficulty with the (a)(1)
standard of numerosity. 46 The Court declined to pass on whether the class satisfied typicality
(the (a)(3) requirement) and representative adequacy (required by (a)(4)), though it noted that
common question of law or fact and typicality tend to merge together and to intertwine with
representative adequacy. 47 Common question of law or fact, the (a)(2) requirement, was the
problem the Court identified. The Court declared, “The crux of this case is commonality—the
rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class.’” 48
The Court began by its analysis of the requirement by saying it should not be read literally, for
every proposed class will have some question of law or fact in common, such as the name of the
defendant. 49 The Court then jumped directly into substantive employment discrimination law,
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See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
Id. at 2551 n.5.
48
Id. at 2550-51.
49
Id. at 2551. In a striking reversal of his frequent role as defender of literal readings of texts, Justice Scalia
declared: “That language is easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises
common “questions.”’ [Richard A.] Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
97, 131–132 (2009). For example: Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for Wal–Mart? Do our managers have
discretion over pay? Is that an unlawful employment practice? What remedies should we get? Reciting these
questions is not sufficient to obtain class certification. Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
class members have suffered the same injury.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (internal quotation and citation
omitted). Justice Scalia’s departure from a textual approach has not escaped notice. See Klonoff, supra note __, at
776 (“It is ironic that Justice Scalia, who typically rejects sources other than the plain language in interpreting
statutes and rules--and who has criticized his colleagues for relying on law review articles--would author an opinion
basing an interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2) on a commentator's general discussion.”) (footnotes omitted); Spencer,
supra note __, at 464 (“Justice Scalia, who often touts his fealty to the written text of enacted rules and statutes,
displays none of that discipline in Dukes.”) (footnote omitted).
47
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declaring that “Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], for example, can be violated in many
ways—by intentional discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate
impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single
company.” 50 Going back to the terms of Rule 23, the Court said that to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the
“common contention . . . must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—
which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 51 Returning to Title VII law, the Court said that
inquiry on this point necessarily overlapped with the merits of the case because under Title VII,
“the crux of the inquiry is the reason for a particular employment decision.” 52 To have a valid
class action concerning the employment decisions, there had to be “some glue holding the
alleged reasons for all those decisions together,” in order to “produce a common answer to the
crucial question why was I disfavored.” 53
Title VII precedent indicated that biased testing procedures would be a common practice
that would support a class action; “significant proof of a general policy of discrimination” would
also suffice. 54 But because there was no allegation that a test had been used, and because the
Court believed that proof of a discriminatory general policy was “entirely absent,” it said the
class failed to comply with Rule 23(a)(2). 55 Affording the managers discretion to promote and
set pay could be the basis of employment discrimination liability under a disparate impact
theory, but unless the plaintiffs “identified a common mode of exercising discretion that
pervades the entire company,” there would be no common answer to the question whether
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Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17) .
Id.
52
Id. at 2552.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 2553.
55
Id.
51
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discrimination occurred. 56 The court found weaknesses in the plaintiffs’ social framework
evidence, and declared that the statistical evidence they advanced did not support an inference of
company-wide discrimination. 57 Moreover, said the Court, the disparate impact claim failed to
identify a specific employment practice, 58 a key component of the Supreme Court case saying
that giving managers discretion could supply a basis for Title VII disparate impact liability. 59
The Court also found that the plaintiffs’ backpay claims were not proper for certification
under Rule 23(b)(2), the part of the rule providing for classes seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief on a classwide basis. 60 It ruled that individualized monetary claims of the type brought by
the plaintiffs belonged in subsection (b)(3), which affords greater procedural protections. 61 The
Court said that Wal-Mart was entitled to individual determinations of eligibility for backpay for
each worker; a sampling and inference procedure advanced by the plaintiffs was, according to
the Court, inadequate. 62 The necessity of individual litigation on liability and relief meant that
backpay was not merely incidental to a classwide injunction, and so could not be afforded in a
Rule 23(b)(2) class proceeding. 63
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Id. at 2554-55.
Id. at 2553-55. The social framework evidence supported the conclusion that there was a corporate culture
susceptible to gender bias, but did not specify how many employment decisions were determined by stereotyped
thinking. Id. at 2553. The plaintiffs’ region-by-region analysis of statistical disparities between number of women
promoted and the numbers in the available pool of hourly workers did not establish a uniform store-by-store
disparity, which the Court thought was needed to meet the common question requirement. Id. at 2555.
58
Id. at 2555.
59
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
60
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
61
Id. at 2558-59.
62
Id. at 2560-61. There are well-thought out arguments for the use of sampling and inference in at least some
instances of aggregate litigation. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18
CONN. INS. L.J. 227 (2012); Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992).
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Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Justice Ginsburg, in an opinion by joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, agreed that the class should not have been certified under subsection (b)(2), but said the case may have been
proper under subsection (b)(3); that issue should have been remanded to the lower courts. Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). She contended the Court erred by confounding (a)(2)’s requirements with
those of (b)(3), and preferred a more literal reading of (b)(2), complete with dictionary references, and she relied on
the principle that certification is not to be overturned absent abuse of discretion. Id. at 2652. She cited the evidence
that women fill 70 percent of hourly jobs at Wal-Mart but constitute only 33 percent of managerial employees, and
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III. Wal-Mart Greets IDEA
It did not take long for defendants in IDEA actions to realize that Wal-Mart’s
interpretation of Rule 23 might be a basis to challenge motions for class certification or to induce
courts to decertify classes previously approved. The courts of appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit have issued two major decisions applying Wal-Mart to IDEA
classes. These remain the two most prominent cases on the topic. Courts have also responded to
Wal-Mart in other IDEA actions, as well as in additional actions that may be analogous to IDEA
cases, such as disability discrimination and other civil rights litigation. Plaintiffs have suffered
some setbacks in these various encounters, but it appears that openings for IDEA class litigation
continue to exist.
A. Jamie S. and DL
The most prominent post-Wal-Mart IDEA class action rulings are Jamie S. v. Milwaukee
Public Schools, 64 decided by the Seventh Circuit early in 2012, and DL v. District of Columbia,65
decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in 2013.
1. Jamie S. Jamie S. overturned a class action settlement and decree in a case brought by
plaintiffs who contended that the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) violated the child-find
requirements of IDEA and that the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) failed in

that in every region, women are paid less than men, a gap that widens over the years even when men and women are
hired into the same positions at the same time. Id. at 2263. The company promotes from within, vacancies are not
posted, and managers have discretion to choose which employees to promote to in-store management. Id. There is a
uniform, $2 band for every position’s hourly pay rate, with managers again having discretion where to locate each
hourly employee within the band. Id. And managers transfer frequently among stores, have frequent meetings, and
are monitored closely. Id. The minority also relied on anecdotal evidence and the district court’s evaluation of the
statistical evidence presented by an expert. It concluded, “The District Court's identification of a common question,
whether Wal–Mart's pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination, was hardly infirm.” Id. at
2564. The Court, Justice Ginsburg said, was really insisting that the common questions predominate, and applying
the (b)(3) standard to the (b)(2) determination was error. Id. at 2565-66.
64
668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012).
65
713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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its responsibilities to ensure MPS followed the law. 66 The district court certified a class of
“students eligible to receive special education from MPS ‘who are, have been or will be’ denied
or delayed entry into or participation in the . . . process” of determining eligibility for special
education services and creating individualized educational programs. 67 After a bench trial, the
court found MPS and DPI liable for failing to identify, locate, and evaluate children with
disabilities in the Milwaukee school district, in violation of IDEA’s child-find provision. 68 A
settlement between the plaintiffs and DPI, but not MPS, followed. 69 The district court approved
the settlement, which included requiring DPI to impose on MPS benchmarks for compliance
with the law requiring timely identification and evaluation of children in MPS’s jurisdiction who
might be eligible for services. 70 The court imposed a remedial plan on MPS, requiring a courtmonitored system to ensure identification and evaluation of the children, and creation of
programs for them. 71 MPS appealed from the classwide remedial order.
In vacating the district court’s order, the Seventh Circuit panel identified a number of
fatal problems with the class: definiteness, commonality, appropriateness of unitary injunctive
relief, and imposition of settlement terms on a nonsettling party. 72 With regard to definiteness,
the court said that “there is no way to know or readily ascertain who is a member of the class.” 73
This criterion is not actually in Rule 23, nor is it in Wal-Mart. In fact, the 1966 Advisory
Committee Notes say with regard to subdivision (b)(2), “Illustrative are various actions in the
civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually
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Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 485.
68
Id. at 488 (discussing district court’s findings regarding compliance with IDEA child-find provision, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(3)).
69
Id. at 488-89.
70
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Id. at 489.
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Id. at 486.
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Id. at 495.
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one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.” 74 But the court did not go back to
basic principles of class action law, and instead declared on its own authority that “a class of
unidentified but potentially IDEA-eligible disabled students is inherently too indefinite to be
certified.” 75
The court also said that the class failed “to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality
prerequisite.” 76 Common question of law or fact was the key problem in Wal-Mart, and received
the bulk of the Jamie S. court’s exposition. The court said the class in Jamie S., which included
children never identified as disabled as well as those identified as disabled but not properly taken
through the process of determining appropriate services, lacked anything more than a generic
common question whether IDEA had been violated, and said that question needed to be
answered separately for each class member. 77 The court thought that child-find violations were
necessarily child specific, and found no proof of a general policy. 78 The Seventh Circuit stressed
Wal-Mart’s requirement that the plaintiff class members suffer the same injury and have a
common contention capable of classwide resolution. 79 This aspect of Jamie S. is the part most
closely tied to the Wal-Mart decision. Its persuasiveness depends on how broadly Wal-Mart
should be applied outside the context of employment discrimination, a question explored later in
this Article. 80
The Jamie S. court also said that final injunctive relief was not appropriate respecting the
class as a whole, because individual determinations of eligibility for special education services,
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23 adv. cmte. note.
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 496.
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Id. at 497
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Id. at 498.
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Id.
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Id. at 497.
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See generally infra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing distinctions between special education law
obligations and employment discrimination law prohibitions).
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and hence relief, would be necessary. 81 Wal-Mart made this point with regard to monetary relief,
specifically the back pay claims of the class members: “We think it clear that individualized
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).” 82 Wal-Mart actually did not rule that individualized
relief could never be a component of an injunctive decree that applied to all persons in a class,
even if the relief entailed payment of money. 83 With regard to individual relief, an IDEA class
action like Jamie S., even one in which the class members seek tuition reimbursement or
compensatory education , is less like a Title VII case than like Quern v. Jordan, 84 in which the
Supreme Court approved an order requiring the defendant in a Rule 23(b)(2) class case to send
claims forms to the class members enabling them to use state administrative procedures to obtain
wrongfully withheld welfare money. 85 The Seventh Circuit itself approved relief in a Rule
23(b)(2) class action that required a state educational agency to pay individual class members’
outstanding bills for educational expenses wrongfully left unpaid in violation of the statute that is
now IDEA. 86 Unlike Title VII, IDEA confers neither a right to a jury trial, 87 nor to
compensatory damages relief, 88 so the logistics of individual relief for group members would be
immensely easier under IDEA than under Title VII. Moreover, in Jamie S. the court did not
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Id. at 499.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. The Court went so far as to reserve the question whether some forms of monetary
relief other than individual back pay awards might be permitted under (b)(2). See id. at 2560. This action would
imply that forms of individual relief that do not involve money at all, such as compensatory education or prospective
orders with respect to specific students, might be cognizable without resort to (b)(3).
83
See id. at 2560 (reserving decision on whether incidental monetary relief may be awarded under Rule 23(b)(2)).
84
440 U.S. 332 (1979).
85
Id. at 346-49.
86
Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1408 (7th Cir. 1985).
87
Compare Loren F. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003) (“No IDEA jury trial right
exists.”) with 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(c) (2006) (requiring jury trial on demand in suits for compensatory or punitive
damages under Title VII).
88
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020 n.24 (1984) (reserving issue but noting consensus of lower courts that
damages are available “only in exceptional circumstances”), superseded by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), (l)
(2006). Under Title VII, in addition to back pay and similar remedies, compensatory and punitive damages are
available to prevailing claimants, subject to limits and conditions, in cases of intentional discrimination. See 42
U.S.C.§ 1981a(b) (2006).
82
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consider whether a class action seeking individual retrospective relief could be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), the alternative course of action held out in Wal-Mart. 89
Finally, Jamie S. said there cannot be a class settlement without a properly certified class,
and the settlement prejudiced the legal rights of the nonsettling MPS by requiring more of it than
the state DPI can require under state law. 90 There is a strange aspect to this part of the decision.
If the federal statute requires the DPI to do what the settlement demanded it to do, then the state
law would have to yield under the Supremacy Clause. 91 But the court never asked whether the
settlement embodied a mandatory duty under IDEA on the part of state educational agencies to
ensure that all school districts in a state comply with child-find obligations.
It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit panel was extremely skeptical on the merits of
the case. 92 It criticized the district court’s reliance on an extrapolation by an expert from a
sample that was never proven to be a representative one, to conclude that children were not being
identified and referred for evaluation. 93 And the court made negative comments about the trial
judge’s decision to excuse exhaustion on the ground that the case was a systemic challenge,
though the Seventh Circuit rendered no final decision on that issue. 94
The court of appeals, however, was not entirely in agreement. An opinion by Judge
Rovner, concurring in part and dissenting in part, accepted the majority’s position that it was
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See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (“[W]e think it clear that individualized monetary claims belong in Rule
23(b)(3).”).
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Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 502.
91
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
92
For a comprehensive discussion of the interaction between the merits of a proposed class action and the class
action determination in light of Wal-Mart, see George Rutherglen, The Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 871 (2012). For an evaluation the use of the merits in two class actions considered by the Supreme
Court after Wal-Mart, see Mark Moller, Common Problems for the Common Answers Test: Class Certification in
Amgen and Comcast, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 301. The Seventh Circuit did not in any obvious way pick up on
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Jamie S., 662 F.3d at 488.
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Id. at 494 & nn.2-3.
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error to impose a class settlement with the state defendant upon the school district defendant. 95
But Judge Rovner rejected the rest of the decision, emphasizing that she was “not convinced that
no class was feasible in this case”; she also disagreed that it is necessary to identify class
members at any time before the remedial phase of the litigation. 96 “A class action based on truly
systemic child-find failure may be viable”; indeed, a class action may constitute “the only
realistic avenue of relief for those injured by systemic violations of their rights.” 97 Policies or
“[w]idespread practices would support a claim” for violations of the child-find requirement. 98
Some have viewed Jamie S. as a reason to doubt that IDEA class actions have a future at
all. One commentator declared, “[T]he Seventh Circuit opinion, combined with a June 2011
Supreme Court decision (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes), means it is likely that Jamie S. already
has played a significant role in ending a period in which class action challenges to special
education systems in school districts around the United States were relatively frequent.” 99 But
the other prominent court of appeals decision issued after Wal-Mart, DL v. District of
Columbia, 100 has a much more sympathetic view of IDEA classes, and it is likely to be as
influential as Jamie S.
2. DL. In DL, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated a class judgment in a case that like
Jamie S. challenged a public school system’s failure to identify, locate, and evaluate children,
and to develop individualized educational programs for them. 101 The opinion of the court of
appeals, however, suggested that a revised class or set of subclasses could satisfy the
requirements of the federal rule as interpreted by Wal-Mart. The court said that the broad class
95
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certified by the district court, one that embraced plaintiffs suffering harms from different policies
and practices at different phases of the child find and service delivery process, lacked a “single
or unified policy or practice” bridging all the class members’ claims. 102 The court compared the
class to the one disapproved in Jamie S., but in the same breath cited Judge Rovner’s partial
dissent with approval and said, “We do not suggest that widespread policies and practices in
violation of the IDEA could never satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement after WalMart.” 103
The court went on to comment that the plaintiffs themselves had proposed to the district
court that it create four subclasses: first, children not identified or located; second, children not
provided timely initial evaluations; third, children not given timely determinations of eligibility
for services; fourth, those not provided a smooth and effective transition from infant and toddler
services to special education services. 104 The district court did not act on the proposal, but
instead retained the broad class definition it had entered in 2006. The court of appeals pointed
out that in a different disability rights case another court of appeals had declared that subclassing
could resolve post-Wal-Mart Rule 23(a) problems, 105 and it remanded for the district court to
consider a different class definition or set of subclass definitions, and then to redetermine
liability and enter relief, if appropriate. 106 A concurrence by Judge Edwards echoed the point that
“the District Court will be free to certify a class or subclass if it determines that a single policy or
practice effectively forecloses disabled children in that class or subclass from pursuing IDEA
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benefits.” 107 Judge Edwards cautioned the district court not to be led astray by any contrary
arguments from the defendant. 108
On remand, the district court took the hint from the court of appeals and certified four
subclasses: (1) children with disabilities between ages three and five who are not identified and
located; (2) children with disabilities in the same age bracket who are not timely evaluated; (3)
children with disabilities, again three to five, who do not receive a timely eligibility
determination and referral for services; (4) children with disabilities of the same ages who do not
receive a smooth and effective transition from birth-through-two services to services from the
public schools. 109 The court found each of the subclasses to meet the common question of law or
fact criterion and the other standards of Rule 23. Discussing common question of law or fact—
what the Wal-Mart Court termed commonality—the district court said the certification of:
Subclasses divided according to specific IDEA violations solves the broadness
problem . . . Each proposed subclass poses the question whether the District’s
policies were adequate to fulfill a specific statutory obligation under the IDEA.
Stated differently, each subclass alleges a uniform practice of failure that harmed
every subclass member the same way. 110
The district court also took up the topic of definiteness, and disagreed with the Jamie S.
court’s contention that “precise ascertainability” is required in a class under subdivision 2(b) of
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Id. at 131 (Edwards, J., concurring). The concurrence quoted extensively from Judge Rovner’s opinion in Jamie
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DL v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 05-1437 (RCL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160018, at *44-*46 (D.D.C. Nov.
8, 2013).
110
Id. at *26. Rather than reinstate its earlier findings on the merits, the court said it would undertake new
proceedings to determine the current state of facts. Id. at *46-*48. The court rejected a motion to dismiss the case
based on standing and mootness, holding that the class determination would relate back in time to the original class
certification that was vacated by the court of appeals. Id. at *48-*55.
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Rule 23. 111 It cited the advisory committee note and authorities from the First and Tenth
Circuits. 112 The court further stated, however, that each of the subclasses was sufficiently
objective in its definition that membership in the class could be determined if necessary. 113
B. Other Post-Wal-Mart Decisions
Jamie S. and DL’s confrontation with Wal-Mart did not take place in a vacuum. Several
less well known cases concerning special education of children with disabilities have considered
class certification and decertification after Wal-Mart. Various disability discrimination cases and
other civil rights actions not involving education have also responded to the decision and its
gloss on Rule 23.
1. Special Education Cases. In several IDEA cases, courts have approved or maintained
class action status after considering Wal-Mart. In Corey H. v. Chicago Board of Education, 114 a
panel of the Seventh Circuit that did not overlap with that of Jamie S. dismissed as moot the
defendant Chicago Public School System’s appeal of the district court’s refusal to decertify the
class and vacate a consent decree the defendant had agreed to in 1998 and 2010. The consent
decree resolved plaintiffs’ complaint that the school system assigned students with disabilities to
schools and classrooms based solely on the students’ disability classifications, in violation of
IDEA’s requirements of individualization and least restrictive environment. 115 The consent
decree expired by its own terms on September 1, 2012, and so the case was no longer a live
controversy and the appeal had to be dismissed. 116 But in rendering that decision the court stated,
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“Even if this case were not moot, we would not grant the relief CPS seeks.” 117 The court stressed
that no objection had previously been made about the class definition, and that no meaningful
change in circumstances had occurred since certification, 118 a conclusion apparently unaffected
by Wal-Mart. The district court had made the point with respect to Wal-Mart’s impact:
[N]either [Wal-Mart v.] Dukes nor Jamie S. “changed” the law on class
certification. Class certification is still governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and the
requirements of that rule have not changed substantively since [the original
certification of] the instant class, and have not changed at all since November
2010 when [the Chicago Public Schools] agreed to the extension of the decree.
Indeed, both Dukes and Jamie S. specifically reaffirm that class certification is
governed by Rule 23, and each analyzed the proposed class under the wellestablished mandates of that rule. . . . The two cases represent nothing more than
the application of Rule 23 to specific sets of facts or, perhaps, to a specific type of
claim under two distinct federal laws—Title VII and the IDEA—both of which
provide for individual equitable relief in addition to injunctive relief. Thus, while
Dukes and Jamie S. may represent clarifications of law, they do not represent a
change in law that requires modification of this consent decree. 119
Other post-Wal-Mart IDEA cases have applied reasoning similar to that of the Corey H.
district court in approving a class action brought by parents of students with autism who said the
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children were more likely to be transferred to new schools after completing a grade than other
students were, and that transfers were made without notice or individual consideration; 120 a class
action challenging delays in putting into place related services for children with disabilities at the
start of each school year; 121 and a class action in a school funding case concerning reallocation of
resources from public schools to charter schools. 122
But the record is mixed, and it is too early to brand Jamie S. an outlier. 123 A district court
denied class action status to two cases claiming that planned school closings in Chicago would
have the likely effect of violating students’ right under IDEA; the court concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to show that the school closings worked a common harm on the members of the
class, affecting them in a uniform way. 124 Class certification was also denied in a case alleging
that a school system’s failure to provide specified services for children with autism violated
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 125 and Title II 126 of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). 127
2. Other Disability Discrimination Actions. Several classes have been certified post-WalMart in actions under disability discrimination statutes; these decisions are closely analogous to
IDEA cases and so might reinforce the conclusion that IDEA class actions remain viable. For
example, a district court certified a class of persons with mental illnesses challenging
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unnecessary institutionalization in state facilities in violation of ADA and Section 504. 128 A case
of this type strongly resembles an IDEA case claiming violations of that statute’s least restrictive
environment mandate. 129 Another district court certified a class in a case challenging a practice
of placing people with developmental or intellectual disabilities in sheltered workshops when
they can be accommodated instead in supported employment settings. 130 The court
acknowledged that the class members could have different needs and preferences regarding
employment services, but it distinguished Wal-Mart on the ground that the intent of the
defendant need not be shown in any of the class members’ cases:
Unlike this case, Wal-Mart was a Title VII gender discrimination case in which
the plaintiffs sought damages. . . . In contrast, the Rehabilitation Act claims
alleged in this case do not require proof of the intent behind the alleged
discrimination, but instead rely on a denial of benefits to disabled persons. Thus,
the Title VII analysis in Wal-Mart is not closely on point. Moreover, plaintiffs in
this case point to a common policy and practice of unnecessary segregation by
DHS and its programs which is capable of classwide resolution. 131
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Kenneth R. ex rel. Tri-County CAP, Inc./GS v. Hassan, No. 12–CV–53–SM, 2013 WL 5273800, (D.N.H. Sept.
17, 2013) The class was defined as: “All persons with serious mental illness who are unnecessarily institutionalized
in New Hampshire Hospital or Glencliff or are at serious risk of unnecessary institutionalization in these facilities.
At risk of institutionalization means persons who, within a two year period: (1) had multiple hospitalizations; (2)
used crisis or emergency room services for psychiatric reasons; (3) had criminal justice involvement as a result of
their mental illness; or (4) were unable to access needed community services.” Id. at *8. Title II of the ADA and
Section 504 prohibit disability discrimination by state and local government, and by recipients of federal financial
assistance, respectively. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The
Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089 (1995). A regulation promulgated to enforce Title II requires that governments
“administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 130(d) (2013).
129
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
130
Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587 (D. Or. 2012). The class definition was: “‘Individuals with intellectual or
developmental disabilities who are in, or who have been referred to, sheltered workshops’ and ‘who are qualified for
supported employment services.’” Id. at 602.
131
Id. at 595-96.
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Similarly, no intent need be shown to sustain an IDEA violation, and, as discussed below,
plaintiffs will frequently be able to identify policies and practices of defendants that violate the
law. 132 A case challenging segregated placements for adults in sheltered workshops is analogous
to a case challenging placements for children in separate classes for emotional disturbance or
other disabilities.
3. Other Civil Rights Cases. Cases brought under civil rights laws that do not encompass
disability discrimination and cases brought under constitutional theories are somewhat further
afield from IDEA actions, but to the degree that they exemplify courts taking narrow rather than
broad readings of Wal-Mart, they are relevant to the future of IDEA class actions. They show
that class actions are still possible in disparate impact Title VII cases, even though Title VII was
the subject matter of Wal-Mart. That reality supports the proposition that class actions should be
available in cases under different statutes and theories. 133
A case in point is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 134 in
which yet another Seventh Circuit panel reversed the denial of class certification in a Title VII
case. The district judge had refused class action status after reviewing Wal-Mart, 135 but the court
of appeals reversed and said that plaintiffs could represent a class consisting of 700 AfricanAmerican brokers in an action against the company over compensation decisions that were at the
discretion of 135 supervisors, each controlling several branch offices. 136 The court distinguished
Wal-Mart on the ground that the plaintiffs identified two discrete policies, one permitting brokers
to form teams among themselves to share clients, the other reassigning clients of those who left
132

See infra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing identification of policies or practices).
In fact, as to be developed below, certification should be easier in non-Title VII cases, so the fact that classes
remain available in Title VII actions may establish, a fortiori, that they should be widely available in IDEA cases.
See infra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing distinctions between Title VII and IDEA).
134
672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
135
District Judge Gettleman (the same judge whose decision not to decertify the class was appealed in Corey H.)
noted that the plaintiffs nevertheless had a strong argument for certification, and encouraged an appeal. Id. at 488.
136
Id.
133
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the firm to other brokers on the basis of the brokers’ records of revenue generated and other
criteria. 137 Although supervisors had discretion to veto teams and to supplement the
reassignment criteria, the court thought the policies could have a disparate impact if racial
prejudice made it harder for African-American brokers to join teams or to generate enough
revenue to have lucrative accounts of former employees reassigned to them. 138 The court stressed
the judicial economy involved with adjudicating the legality of the policies in a class proceeding,
even though “hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which class members
were actually adversely affected by one or both of the practices and if so what loss each class
member sustained.” 139 It concluded, “We have trouble seeing the downside of the limited class
action treatment that we think would be appropriate in this case.” 140
In another Title VII action, a court refused to decertify a Rule 23(b)(2) class of AfricanAmerican and Latino teachers alleging that the school board required them to pass a test to
receive or retain their teaching licenses and the test had an unjustified disparate impact. 141 The
court limited the class claims to those for non-individualized remedies, including a declaratory
judgment as to liability and injunctive relief benefiting the class as a whole. 142 In a case alleging
violations of substantive due process and other constitutional rights of children in foster care
long-term residential settings, asserting unsafe living conditions and severe risks of
psychological and physical harm, a district court recertified a class after an earlier certification

137

Id. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
139
Id. at 491.
140
Id. at 492. The court pointed out that certification on limited issues is permitted under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
Id. at 491.
141
Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 907 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) The court noted that Wal-Mart left open the
possibility of incidental monetary relief in a (b)(2) class, but said that incidental monetary relief would not cover
claims that would require individual hearings to adjudicate. Id. at 505 n.4. The court reserved the issue of whether a
Rule 23(b)(3) class could be established with regard to relief upon the finding that liability existed. Id. at 507.
142
Id. at 506-08.
138
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had been vacated by the court of appeals. 143 The district court distinguished Wal-Mart on the
basis of the conduct the plaintiffs identified as leading to the physical and psychological harms
the class suffered: the practice of assigning caseworkers excessive caseloads and the lack of any
practice of considering a child’s special needs when making caseloads assignments. 144
IV. Potential Responses to Wal-Mart in IDEA Cases
On the record so far, it is hardly obvious that Wal-Mart will mean the end of IDEA class
actions, or even create much of a barrier to class litigation in special education cases. As the
post-Wal-Mart caselaw suggests, however, plaintiffs who wish to challenge what they perceive
as systemic violations of the law will likely try to distinguish IDEA from Title VII cases similar
to Wal-Mart, and they may have to alter the classes they ask to be certified and the relief they ask
to be entered. Alternatively, they may change their entire approach to systemic litigation by
using various non-class-action procedures for achieving legal relief for groups of parents and
children.
A. Class Action Approaches
After Wal-Mart, it is likely that plaintiffs and their lawyers will rely on three possible
approaches in pursuing IDEA class actions. 145 First, they might argue that Wal-Mart is largely
irrelevant to cases under IDEA because so much of its reasoning depends on aspects of
substantive employment discrimination law that differ from the law of special education. Under a
second approach, they would take Wal-Mart’s applicability to IDEA as a given but distinguish
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M.D. v. Perry, No. 2:11-CV-84, 2013 WL 4537955 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (certifying class), on remand from M.D. ex
rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012) (vacating prior class certification).
144
Id. at *26-*34.
145
One recent source questions whether class actions are likely to be an effective strategy in addressing the
enforcement of IDEA for children who are in poverty, noting potential logistical and doctrinal obstacles. Eloise
Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 145658 (2011). The methods suggested here respond to at least some of the problems of legal doctrine, but it is not
contended that class actions are the ideal solution to all deprivations of educational rights of children with
disabilities.
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Wal-Mart by identifying policies and practices precisely and framing classes around them. A
third approach, probably combined with one of the other two, would be simply to make proposed
classes smaller and more homogenous. 146
1. Distinctions Between Title VII and IDEA. Wal-Mart’s insistence that there be a
uniform policy being challenged in a class case is linked to the specifics of Title VII disparate
impact law. 147 Plaintiffs in IDEA cases might argue that the court in Jamie S. fell into the trap of
thinking that the underlying Title VII law in Wal-Mart is the same as the underlying law in an
IDEA case. They would have a point: the law is not the same; it is not even similar. As noted,
much of the common-question part of Wal-Mart looks more like a the interpretation of
substantive Title VII law than an interpretation of Rule 23 that would apply to other contexts. 148
The Supreme Court said in Wal-Mart that the need to specify a policy arose because of the
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This discussion places to one side the possibility of class action litigation in the state courts, for if defendants
anticipate that the federal courts will be less favorably disposed to class litigation, they will probably remove the
case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). On the general topic of state court class action litigation on
the basis of non-federal claims, see Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class
Action Litigation over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REV. 979 (1999).
147
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013)
(“[T]he commonality holding in Dukes is at base a statement of Title VII policy.”); see also id. at 1029 (“A more
careful focus on the relationship between Title VII policy and the operation of Rule 23 serves to clarify the Dukes
decision and highlights possible grounds for critiquing and distinguishing the Court’s ruling.”).
148
As the Court stated in Wal-Mart: “The class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in
the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.” 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52 (2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759,
801 (2012) (“An alternative reading of Wal-Mart . . . would be to simply conclude that the majority has used the
procedural question in Rule 23(a)(2) to make both factual and legal conclusions about the merits of the Wal-Mart
case.”); Ellen Meriwether, The "Hazards" of Dukes: Antitrust Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Fear the Supreme
Court's Decision, ANTITRUST, Fall 2011, at 18 (“Certainly, given the size and shape of the Dukes class, the
idiosyncratic nature of employment decisions, and the nuances of Title VII jurisprudence at issue there, Dukes can
be convincingly distinguished.”) Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 387 (2011) (“Although Wal-Mart formally is a case about
class certification, , the procedural analysis takes shape in the shadow of the substantive theory of liability.”). Courts
in cases other than those brought under IDEA and the disability discrimination statutes have relied on the differences
between Title VII and the statutory claims in the cases. See Trask, supra note ___ [DePaul], at 799 & n.44
(collecting cases). On the other hand, Wal-Mart’s focus on individual employment decisions and relief may further
complicate class action litigation in Americans with Disabilities Act cases concerning employment. See Brandon L.
Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 640 (2012) (discussing potential
impact of Wal-Mart on ADA class action employment litigation); cf. Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E.
Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 883-84 (2006) (noting infrequency
of ADA employment class actions).
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disparate impact nature of the Title VII claim the plaintiffs advanced. 149 In Jamie S., the
plaintiffs were not alleging discrimination in the Title VII disparate impact sense, but rather the
failure to follow a specific statutory duty to identify and serve a designated group of children.
Neither the motivation of the defendants—the key issue in any Title VII disparate treatment
case, 150 nor a practice with an unjustified negative impact on a protected group—the key issue in
a Title VII disparate impact case, 151 is relevant to the question whether a public school system
failed to meet its child-find obligations. IDEA cases concerning placement, least restrictive
environment, appropriate education, related services, and other issues, similarly do not depend
on the defendant’s motivation. The question is simply whether the defendant met its statutory
obligations.
The elements of an IDEA claim differ from those of a Title VII claim because the
statutory obligations of IDEA are of a profoundly different character than those of Title VII.
With an exception not relevant here, 152 the obligation Title VII imposes is negative: the
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Id. at 2555 (“There is another, more fundamental, respect in which respondents' statistical proof fails. Even if it
established (as it does not) a pay or promotion pattern that differs from the nationwide figures or the regional figures
in all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists. Some managers
will claim that the availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’ area does not
mirror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will claim to have been applying some sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from store to store. In the landmark case of ours
which held that giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be the basis of Title VII liability under a disparateimpact theory, the plurality opinion conditioned that holding on the corollary that merely proving that the
discretionary system has produced a racial or sexual disparity is not enough. ‘[T]he plaintiff must begin by
identifying the specific employment practice that is challenged.’ Watson [v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust], 487 U.S., at
994; accord, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (approving that statement), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k).”)
150
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (establishing method to prove motivation
of employer in disparate treatment case under Title VII).
151
See 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if-- (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.”).
152
Title VII imposes an affirmative obligation to provide reasonable accommodation of religion, but this duty is
modest. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
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employer must not discriminate. In Wal-Mart, the Court required the proponents of the class to
show that the defendant acted to commit a violation of that negative duty, in a sufficiently
uniform way for the effects on the class members to be common. The plaintiff had to identify a
policy or practice in order to show that the actions were similar enough to meet the standards of
Rule 23 as the Court understood it. By contrast, in an IDEA case the defendant has affirmative
obligations, not merely negative ones. 153 It must identify, evaluate, create appropriate programs,
make placements in integrated settings with adequate related services, review the programs, etc.
These are all affirmative obligations, and simply not doing any one or more of them will in a
similar way affect all children for whom the defendant fails to meet the obligation.
This point was, of course, the guiding insight of the court of appeals opinion in DL. In
that case, the district court on remand placed the contrast with Wal-Mart in sharp relief:
Absent a uniform policy of discrimination, the [Wal-Mart] Court found it
impossible to establish the same discriminatory bias among managers from over
3,000 stores throughout the country. By contrast, resolution of the present claims
turns on objective, statutorily defined obligations that lack the amorphous quality
of Title VII decisions . . . Where there is a statutory obligation to act, there is a
significant difference between challenging the inadequacy or complete failure to

Court’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) as “nullifying” religious accommodation duty). The obligation to
provide reasonable accommodation for disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act is much higher. See
H.R. REP. NO. 101–485, pt. 2, at 68 (“The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison . . . are not applicable to this legislation.”); S. REP. NO. 101–116, at 36 (same).
153
Distinctions of this type are pervasive in Civil Rights Law, and frequently call for vastly different judicial
outcomes depending on whether the legal obligation that exists is one to affirmatively do something or merely to
refrain from doing something. See Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive
Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 289-90 (2004) (contrasting negative obligations
under Constitution as currently interpreted with positive obligations under Americans with Disabilities Act).
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enact policies and procedures and alleging an erroneous application of a policy to
individuals. 154
All this is not to say that these distinctions between Title VII law and IDEA will
necessarily be persuasive to all courts. Perhaps wishing more than predicting, scholars thought
that the Supreme Court’s first cases lowering summary judgment standards for defendants 155 and
raising pleading standards for plaintiffs 156 would have limited reach in civil rights actions
because the cases dealt with antitrust claims, and oddly conceived antitrust claims at that. 157 The
Supreme Court promptly proved these views wrong by applying the changes in summary
judgment 158 and pleading 159 practice to civil rights and other areas. 160
2. Framing IDEA Cases as Challenges to Policies. In IDEA cases involving systemic
violations of the IDEA by a school district, plaintiffs will often be able to identify policies or
practices the class was subject to, even if a court insists that the policies be narrowly framed.
Specification of a policy should avoid the definiteness and identification-of-class-members
problems that the Jamie S. court found present in that case. 161 Naming a policy “pins down,” or
at least creates the possibility of pinning down, the identities of the class members, for each class
member is a child subject to the policy. 162 Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 163 a Seventh
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DL v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 05-1437 (RCL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160018, at *27 (Nov. 8, 2013).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
156
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
157
See, e.g., Jana E. Cuellar, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Handling the Element of Intent
in Summary Judgment Motions, 38 EMORY L.J. 523, 548-49 (1989) (discussing summary judgment standard after
Matsushita); Michael Dorf, The End of Notice Pleading, Dorf on Law (May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (discussing pleading standard after Twombly).
158
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
159
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
160
One sources has raised the same point regarding Wal-Mart. Sherry, supra note __, at 34 (“There is a danger that
future cases building on the Wal-Mart precedent will engage in the same kind of expansive interpretation as
occurred between Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly and Ashcroft v Iqbal.”) (footnotes omitted).
161
See Trask, supra note ___, at 800-01 (describing use of this approach in employment discrimination and other
contexts and collecting cases).
162
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 497.
163
565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977).
155
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Circuit case criticized by Jamie S., 164 but ultimately distinguished rather than limited or
overruled, 165 supports the idea that specification of a policy will provide enough definiteness to
support class certification. Rochford pointed out, “In those cases in which class certification has
been denied on account of indefiniteness, the primary defect in the class definition has been that
membership in the class was contingent on the state of mind of the prospective class
members,” 166 rather than contingent on the defendant’s conduct toward the class members. In
contrast, all individuals subject to a policy or practice are affected by the conduct of the
defendant. 167 As noted above, the state of mind of neither the defendant nor the class member is
likely to be of relevance in an IDEA case. 168
Specification of a policy will also take a class past the common-question-of-law-or-fact
problem of Wal-Mart. Jamie S.’s language is instructive:
There is no such thing as a “systemic” failure to find and refer individual disabled
children for IEP evaluation—except perhaps if there was “significant proof” that
MPS operated under child-find policies that violated the IDEA. As the Supreme
Court noted in Wal-Mart, an illegal policy might provide the “glue” necessary to
litigate otherwise highly individualized claims as a class. But again, as in WalMart, proof of an illegal policy “is entirely absent here.” 169
It is likely that plaintiffs confronted with a challenge based on this aspect of Jamie S.’s
interpretation of Wal-Mart will take the Jamie S. court’s “except perhaps” and run with it. Corey
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Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 496 (“Rochford's tolerance of a wildly indefinite class definition under Rule 23 is no longer
the norm.”).
165
Id. at 497.
166
Rochford, 565 F.2d at 978.
167
Id. (“In our case membership in the classes certified by the district court is based exclusively on the defendants'
conduct with no particular state of mind required. Thus, there is no definiteness problem, as read into Rule 23 by
other courts, created by these classes.”).
168
See supra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing irrelevance of motivation in IDEA cases).
169
668 F.3d 481, 498 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added; citations and additional reference deleted).
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H. demonstrates the strength of this approach. The district court in Corey H. said: “As the
Seventh Circuit noted in Jamie S., the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes indicates that an illegal
policy that applies to the entire class ‘provide[s] the “glue” necessary to litigate otherwise highly
individualized claims as a class.’” 170
Courts in other IDEA cases have certified classes after Wal-Mart on the basis of policies
and practices that were not closely specified, thus suggesting that the name-the-policy hurdle is
not a high one. For example, a school district’s practice of being likely to involuntarily transfer
children with autism upon completion of a grade sufficed; 171 a practice of delaying the start of
related services until after the beginning of the school year was enough; 172 and special education
funding allocation decisions were sufficient as well. 173 So too in non-IDEA cases. In
McReynolds, the Title VII case involving the African-American brokers, the court found that the
Rule 23(a)(2) common-question requirement was met when the plaintiffs challenged two
company-wide policies (allowing brokers themselves, rather than their managers, to form and
staff teams, and basing account redistribution on the past success of brokers competing for the
transferred accounts) and viewed this as sufficient to distinguish the case from Wal-Mart, even
though the company delegated broad discretion over decisions affecting compensation to
supervisors in 600 branch offices. 174
If a policy is adequately identified, plaintiffs should have no difficulty satisfying the Rule
23(b)(2) requirement that injunctive relief be appropriate regarding the class as a whole, the
second obstacle to class certification in Wal-Mart. Appropriate classwide relief would be
170

Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 92 C 3409, 2012 WL 2953217, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2012) (citations omitted),
app. dismissed, No. 12-2834, 2013 WL 4535788 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2013).
171
P.V. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 289 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
172
R.A-G v. Buffalo City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 12–CV–960S, 2013 WL 3354424 at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 3,
2013).
173
Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, No. CIV A 12-132, 2012 WL 1473969 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012).
174
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 672 F.3d 482, 488-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
338 (2012).
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abolishing the policy plus ancillary steps the Supreme Court has already approved incident to
abolishing policies, such as notice of the right to demand a hearing to obtain individualized
relief. 175 The fact that individual determinations would be needed in addition to the classwide
injunction did not stop the court in McReynolds from overturning the denial of certification under
23(b)(2):
Obviously a single proceeding, while it might result in an injunction, could not
resolve class members' claims. Each class member would have to prove that his
compensation had been adversely affected by the corporate policies, and by how
much. So should the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide
proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which class
members were actually adversely affected by one or both of the practices and if so
what loss each class member sustained—and remember that the class has 700
members. But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those trials to determine
whether the challenged practices were unlawful. Rule 23(c)(4) provides that
“when appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues.” The practices challenged in this case present a pair of
issues that can most efficiently be determined on a class-wide basis, consistent
with the rule just quoted. 176
The dissent and concurrence in Jamie S. made the same point as McReynolds with regard
to Rule 23(a)(2) common question of law or fact:
The problem here is that the plaintiffs' claims appear to be based on multiple,
disparate failures to comply with the school district's statutory child-find
175

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). See generally supra text accompanying notes___ (discussing Quern and
other authority).
176
McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490-91.
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obligations rather than a truly systemic policy or practice which affects them
all. 177
Judge Rovner also said “widespread practices might also support . . . a claim.” 178 She
cited the example of a school district ignoring and failing to refer to evaluation students with a
particular type of disability, for example, dyslexia, so all class members would suffer a common
injury from failure to have appropriate systems in place to identify them. She also cited several
prominent cases in which class members could not be identified until they come forward for
relief, and declared, “[T]here will be times when the nature of the challenged conduct makes it
difficult if not impossible to identity who is in the class and is entitled to relief absent some sort
of opt-in procedure by putative class members coupled with an adjudicatory procedure to
confirm that they in fact qualify as class members.” 179
One can easily imagine that plaintiffs in a case alleging violations of IDEA child-find
will try to find an email or other directive telling teachers not to refer children for evaluation, or
not to refer them after a certain point in the school year. Similarly, they may look for evidence of
a quota system for referrals, or a system by which an administrator in no position to make
informed, individualized determinations has to approve referrals. Or plaintiffs might seek
evidence that teachers receive bad evaluations or are penalized in some other way if they make
too many requests that children be evaluated for special education. Any of these things could
amount to proof of a policy or practice that would support certification. In a case concerning
failure to place in the least restrictive environment, plaintiffs might look for directives that
children with a certain disability classification always be placed in a program of a specific type
irrespective of individual needs and abilities. In a case challenging denial of a particular type of
177

Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 505 (Rovner. J. concurring).
Id.
179
Id. at 506.
178
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appropriate but costly services, such as applied behavioral analysis, the plaintiffs might try to
uncover evidence of written or unwritten orders not to find that children have needs that can be
met by the services.
A prominent authority on class action litigation has noted that specifying a policy appears
to be a successful means to avoid the effects of Wal-Mart in cases not involving employment
discrimination:
When we look at cases outside the employment-discrimination field, we find
many courts that have been able to distinguish Wal-Mart because the case before
them involves a common policy that is applied uniformly to all class members
and does not depend on discretionary decision makers. This has been true, for
example, in wage-and-hour labor disputes under state and federal law, where
courts have noted that uniform underlying policies are involved and that there are
no discretionary decisions by supervisors at issue. Similar reasoning and
distinctions have supported favorable Rule 23(a)(2) rulings in suits involving
breach of form contracts, deceptive trade or advertising practices, insurance
coverage, securities and antitrust class actions, and in prisoner civil-rights cases,
Fair Housing Act litigation, and other constitutional litigation. And in yet other
cases, courts have distinguished Wal-Mart on the ground that the statistical or
other proof provided by the plaintiffs was sufficient to identify a common course
of conduct. 180
IDEA litigation may well become another such category of cases.
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Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1015, 1042-44 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
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3. Creating Smaller and Simpler classes. The Wal-Mart Court seemed bothered by the
fact that the class was so large, and in McReynolds, the court mentions the potential that accuracy
of case resolutions will be undermined if the magnitude of a class so raises the stakes that
reasonable defendants have no option but settling. 181 Jamie S. did not identify the size of the
class as an independent problem with certification, but it did refer to the problems with proving
the case on the merits when the district court’s inference that children were not being identified
and evaluated depended on extrapolation from a non-scientifically selected sample of 200 files
for a school system with an annual enrollment of 95,000 to 97,000 students, 16,000 of whom
were special-education eligible in any given year. 182 Perhaps too much should not be made of the
issue of size. Corey H. was huge in scale, and that did not faze the court of appeals. The Chicago
school-closing litigation involved relatively small classes, and yet the court denied certification,
though in those instances the injury was not particularly similar among class members.
Simplicity and homogeneity may be the real desiderata of the courts interpreting WalMart. DL, for example, opened the door for an argument that the subclasses suggested by the
plaintiffs could satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) as interpreted by Wal-Mart. 183 Each of those subclasses
would of course be smaller than the mega-class created by the order the court vacated; more to
the point, each would be homogeneous in that in each the children suffered from a specific,
common violation of the law. 184
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McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491 (“If resisting a class action requires betting one's company on a single jury verdict,
a defendant may be forced to settle; and this is an argument against definitively resolving an issue in a single case if
enormous consequences ride on that resolution.”). This problem appears to be more realistic in cases involving
business defendants and large-scale damages relief than in IDEA cases.
182
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 488.
183
DL, 713 F.3d at 128.
184
See DL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160018, at *16 (“Certification of subclasses is particularly suitable in a case such
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claims pursuant to particular federal and state constitution, statutory, and regulatory obligations of the defendants.’”)
(quoting Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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As a matter of fundamental class action law, having a large number of class members is a
necessity, 185 and bigness does not by itself disqualify a class. 186 The Court has continued to cite
and rely upon Califano v. Yamasaki, 187 a case that approved a nationwide class of more than a
million Social Security Old Age and Disability Insurance recipients, 188 in Wal-Mart itself 189 and
most recently in 2013’s Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. 190 But the risk that the judicial pendulum has
begun to swing in the other direction may counsel caution about overly large classes. 191
B. Non-Class Action Systemic Litigation
If Wal-Mart’s ultimate impact is to render class actions in IDEA cases more inaccessible,
there may be other options to try to achieve group or systemwide impact. These possibilities
include individual actions for broad relief, group-based administrative proceedings, and perhaps,
with the cooperation of a public entity, government-sponsored litigation.
1. Individual Actions for Broad Relief. In some instances, courts have entered broad
injunctions or other widely effective remedies in cases brought by individual plaintiffs. Some
185

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all members only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”).
186
See generally William J. Hubbard, Optimal Class Size, Dukes, and the Funny Thing about Shady Grove, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 693 (2013) (discussing economies of scale and other issues concerning large classes and collecting
authorities).
187
442 U.S. 682 (1979).
188
See Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D. Haw. 1974), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 564 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1977), aff’d in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
189
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550.
190
133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
191
One author notes that in response to the Wal-Mart decision, workers at the chain have begun a campaign of
single-state class actions. Trask, supra note __ [DePaul L. Rev.] at 797 (citing news source); see also Mollie A.
Murphy, Rule 23(b) After Wal-Mart: (Re) Considering A "Unitary" Standard, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 764 (2012)
(“In the near-term, the Court's decision is likely to provoke a number of reactions as judges and lawyers sort out its
implications. For example, lawyers may seek (and judges may be more likely to approve) certification of smaller,
more cohesive classes.”); Resnik, supra note __, at 164 (“[T]he Court in Wal-Mart is right to worry about the scope
and size of the Dukes class, which would have had to prove that an official policy of nondiscrimination coupled with
corporate culture and managerial discretion at 3400 stores worked, systemwide, a discriminatory pattern or practice
or had a disparate impact.”); Tippett, supra note __, at 468 (noting that class actions with localized geographic scope
are more likely to satisfy Wal-Mart in employment discrimination cases challenging subjective decision making). As
Professor Selmi has noted, a reason the Wal-Mart plaintiffs preferred a huge, nationwide class may have been to
facilitate the use of statistical inference. Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After WalMart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 494 (2011) (“[T]he desire to cast the case as a nationwide class
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celebrated cases in this category include Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 192
involving affirmative action in higher education, and Honig v. Doe, 193 involving disciplinary
process protections for students with disabilities. Olmstead v. L.C., the case establishing a right
to placement in the community rather than institutions for individuals with intellectual
disabilities who desired and could benefit from less restrictive settings, was not a class action. 194
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whenever an action is brought in whole or in
part for the benefit of persons other than the person bringing it and the court enters relief in
accordance with that objective, the nonparty has a right to enforce the final order. 195 Following
this principle, a court permitted nonparties to enforce an order against welfare cuts, 196 and
another permitted individuals who were not parties to a consent decree that allowed some
undocumented immigrants to receive Supplemental Security Income benefits to seek to enforce
the injunction. 197
There are drawbacks to relying on individual actions, including the risk that defendants
will ignore stare decisis effects of decisions they do not like, as well as the more favorable
treatment of class cases with regard to some aspects of mootness doctrine, but in a given instance
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195
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other grounds, 523 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008).
197
Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985); cf . Floyd v. Ortiz, 300 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2002) (reversing
decision striking prisoner’s petition for enforcement of judgment in case regarding use of canteen funds, in which
class certification was not granted but resolved by agreement that said it would benefit and be enforceable by all
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an individual case may achieve broad benefits. 198 There is no reason this cannot be true in at
least some IDEA litigation.
2. Group-Based Administrative Proceedings. As Professor Davis once pointed out,
historically a major motivation for creating administrative agencies was the widespread belief
that the courts are slow, expensive, and potentially biased against enforcing reform legislation. 199
Group litigation in administrative settings may be a superior approach to perhaps chancy class
action litigation brought in the first instance to the courts. In addition to providing for due
process hearing procedures, IDEA requires that state educational agencies receive written
complaints alleging violations of the statute, investigate them, and issue a decision within 60
days of filing. 200 Advocates have used the administrative process to address widespread failings
of school systems. 201 The Southern Poverty Law Center recently filed an administrative
complaint on behalf of all students with special needs in the New Orleans public schools,
claiming failure on a systemic basis to provide equal access to educational services in the charter
school-dominated system established after Hurricane Katrina. 202 The Office for Civil Rights of
the United States Department of Education accepts, investigates, and adjudicates complaints
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in federally assisted educational activities such
as those of public school districts; these complaints may be brought on an individual or systemic
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199
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 14 (3d ed. 1972).
200
See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-.153 (2013).
201
See generally WEBER, supra note __ [Treatise] § 12.4 (describing complaint resolution process and collecting
examples of its use in individual and systemic cases).
202
See Southern Poverty Law Center, Children with Disabilities Face Discrimination in New Orleans Schools,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc-complaint-children-with-disabilities-face-discrimination-in-neworleans-schoo (July 28, 2010).
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basis. 203 Scholars writing about areas other than special education law have urged the wider use
of class-style administrative proceedings to address systemic illegality. 204 Of course, if the group
administrative challenge proves unsuccessful, the claimants contemplating judicial review of the
decision will be left with many of the same post-Wal-Mart problems of bringing an action in
court as they would have if they brought the action there in the first place.
3. Government-Initiated Group Litigation. Some governmental entities have the
capacity to bring proceedings for the benefit of groups of individuals with disabilities, including
children in schools; 205 when those entities act they are not necessarily subject to the limits that
courts may place on class representatives in federal cases. A district court in California recently
rendered a decision in an action brought by the California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing against the Law School Admission Council alleging failure to provide disability-related
accommodations to LSAT takers, in violation of California law and the ADA. 206 The action
sought damages and injunctive relief “both on behalf of seventeen named individuals and as a
‘group or class’ complaint on behalf of ‘all disabled individuals in the State of California who
requested a reasonable accommodation for the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) from
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January 19, 2009 to the present.’” 207 The court held that the agency did not need to make a
motion for class certification under Rule 23. 208 It pointed out that the Supreme Court had
permitted the EEOC to bring an action under Title VII seeking broad injunctive relief and
backpay for a company’s employees in several states without seeking class certification, and
relied on the analogy to that and other similar cases. 209
Conclusion
Class actions remain an option to address systemic violations of the special education
law. They may be somewhat different in form and size after Wal-Mart, and they may be
supplemented, though probably not supplanted, by other mechanisms to enforce the law when a
school system or other entity commits a widespread violation of the educational rights of
children with disabilities. The class action landscape has been altered, but the ground remains.
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Id. at *11-*12 (citing General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980)). More vigorous action by the EEOC and
similar entities has been urged as a response to the difficulties to private class action litigation created by Wal-Mart.
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